

Information & Communication Security (SS 16)

Privacy Protection

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www.m-chair.de

- Data Protection and Privacy
 - Origin and definition
 - Law, Technology, Standardization
- Technical Privacy Protection
 - Communication systems
 - Transaction systems
- Integrated Privacy Protection
 - Privacy by Design (PbD)
 - PRIME LBS
 - ABC4Trust
 - Privacy Advisor
 - Privacy Risk Communication and Mitigation

- Both terms are related but not synonymous and have many definitions.
- 2 popular ones:
 - **Data protection** is the protection from harmful and unsolicited usage of data linked to the personal sphere of a person.
 - **Privacy** is the right to be left alone, e.g. to be unwatched or anonymous [WaBr1890].
- More work needed on a complete understanding of privacy
- Nevertheless the topic is important, as one can see from related incidents and activities to address the issue.

The Origin of Data Protection?

- The term “Privacy” (**‘the right to be left alone’**) originates from Warren & Brandeis [WaBr1890].
- Data protection in Germany (“Datenschutz”) originates from concerns over too much information and power in the hands of large (governmental) institutions (“**Big Brother**”).
- Nowadays Data protection and Privacy in Germany are based on the right of informational self determination derived from the constitution in the “Volkszählungsurteil“ [BVG1983]).
- ***Germany has one of the most advanced infrastructures for Privacy*** but still no established German language term for Privacy beyond the (misleading) “Datenschutz”.
- Some (more or less established) related terms are:
 - Privatheit
 - Privatsphäre
 - Schutz der Privatsphäre

EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

- The EC adopted a new EU legal framework on the protection of personal data.
- The regulation will enter into force on 24 May 2016, it shall apply from 25 May 2018.
- The European Commission says that the regulation “puts the citizens back in control of their data, notably through”:
 - A right to be forgotten: Users will have the right to demand that data about them be deleted if there are no "legitimate grounds" for it to be kept.
 - People will have easier access to their own data, and will find it easier to transfer it from one service provider to another.
 - Putting people in control
 - Organizations must notify the authorities about data breaches as early as possible, "if feasible within 24 hours".
 - In cases where consent is required organizations must explicitly ask for permission to process data, rather than assume it.
 - Privacy by design and by default - privacy friendly default settings to be the norm.

- **Lawfulness, fairness and transparency:** personal data must be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject.
- **Purpose limitation:** personal data must be collected for specified explicit and legitimate purposes.
- **Data minimisation:** personal data must be adequate, relevant and limited to **what is necessary** in relation to the purposes for which they are processed.
- **Accuracy:** personal data must be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay.

- **Storage limitation:** personal data must be kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for **no longer than is necessary** for the purposes for which the personal data are processed.
- **Integrity and confidentiality:** personal data must be processed in a way that ensures **appropriate security** of the personal data.
- **Accountability:** The controller shall be responsible for and be able to demonstrate compliance to the principles mentioned above.

- The controller shall be responsible for and be able to demonstrate compliance to the regulation to:
 - maintain certain documentation,
 - conduct a data protection impact assessment for more risky processing (data controllers should compile lists of what is caught), and
 - implement data protection by design and by default, e.g., data minimisation.

Law Alone is not Sufficient

- The increased usage of IT systems and networks leads to
 - huge amounts of data
 - easily searchable data
 - automatic analysis,
 - and knowledge extraction
- Data protection / Privacy law alone not sufficient
 - Not all processing can be controlled (e.g. every network node).
 - Deliberate breaking and bending of law (different legislations on the internet)
 - Economic pressure can force customers to give consent to almost any kind of 'privacy' policy (e.g. selling privacy for "peanuts").
- Slow pace of privacy self-regulation in the US, Focus on self-help
 - Self regulation by sustaining user ignorance
 - Enforcing norms may violate anti-trust.
 - Being a good actor (e.g. by exposing privacy practices) increases liability.
 - Legal compliance and related business processes (deemed) expensive


[Reagle1998, SelfReg1999, Bell2001, Hoofnagle2005]

- ⇒ Technical Privacy Protection
- ⇒ Standardization


ISO/IEC IS 29100:2011 Privacy Framework defines the following privacy principles:

1. Consent and choice
2. Purpose legitimacy and specification
3. Collection limitation
4. Data minimization
5. Use, retention and disclosure limitation
6. Accuracy and quality
7. Openness, transparency and notice
8. Individual participation and access
9. Accountability
10. Information security
11. Privacy compliance

SC 27 “IT Security Techniques” within ISO/IEC JTC1



WGs within ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 - IT Security Techniques



Frameworks & Architectures

- A Framework for Identity Management (ISO/IEC 24760, WD)
- A Privacy Framework (ISO/IEC 29100, WD)
- A Privacy Reference Architecture (ISO/IEC 29101, WD)
- A Framework for Access Management (ISO/IEC 29146, WD)

Protection Concepts

- Biometric template protection (ISO/IEC 24745, WD)
- Access Control Mechanisms (Study Period)

Guidance on Context and Assessment

- Authentication Context for Biometrics (ISO/IEC 24761, FDIS)
- Entity Authentication Assurance (ISO/IEC 29115, WD)
- Privacy Capability Maturity Models (Study Period)

Frameworks & Architectures

- A Framework for Identity Management (ISO/IEC 24760, FCD, WD, WD)
- Privacy Framework (ISO/IEC 29100, FCD)
- Privacy Reference Architecture (ISO/IEC 29101, CD)
- Entity Authentication Assurance Framework (ISO/IEC 29115 / ITU-T X.eaa, CD)
- A Framework for Access Management (ISO/IEC 29146, WD)

Protection Concepts

- Biometric information protection (ISO/IEC 24745, FDIS)
- Requirements for partially anonymous, partially unlinkable authentication (ISO/IEC 29191, CD)

Guidance on Context and Assessment

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- Privacy Capability Assessment Model (ISO/IEC 29190, WD)

Frameworks & Architectures

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- Privacy Architecture Framework (ISO/IEC 29101, CD)
- Entity Authentication Assurance Framework (ISO/IEC 29115 / ITU-T X.1254 (formerly X.eaa), DIS)
- A Framework for Access Management (ISO/IEC 29146, WD)
- Telebiometric authentication framework using biometric hardware security module (ITU-T X.bhsm | ISO/IEC 17922, WD)

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- Authentication Context for Biometrics (ISO/IEC 24761, IS)
- Privacy Capability Assessment Model (ISO/IEC 29190, WD)
- Code of practice for data protection controls for public cloud computing services (ISO/IEC 27018, WD)
- Identity Proofing (NWIP)
- Privacy impact assessment - methodology (NWIP)

Frameworks & Architectures

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Guidance on Context and Assessment

- Authentication Context for Biometrics (ISO/IEC 24761, IS)
- Privacy Capability Assessment Model (ISO/IEC 29190, IS)
- Code of practice for PII protection in public clouds acting as PII processors (ISO/IEC 27018, IS)
- Identity Proofing (ISO/IEC 29003, WD)
- Privacy impact assessment - Methodology (ISO/IEC 29134, WD)
- Code of practice for the protection of personally identifiable information (ISO/IEC 29151, WD)

Frameworks & Architectures


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- Privacy framework (ISO/IEC 29100, IS:2011)
- Privacy architecture framework (ISO/IEC 29101, IS:2013)
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Protection Concepts


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Guidance on Context and Assessment


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- Privacy impact assessment - methodology (ISO/IEC 29134, DIS)
- Code of practice for PII protection (ITU-T X.gpim | ISO/IEC 29151, DIS)
- Privacy enhancing data de-identification techniques (ISO/IEC 20889, WD)
- Guidelines for online privacy notice and consent (ISO/IEC 29184, WD)




WG 5 Identity Management & Privacy Technologies Roadmap (2010-10)




WG 5 Identity Management & Privacy Technologies Roadmap (2014-09)




WG 5 Identity Management & Privacy Technologies Roadmap (2016-05)







Privacy/PII Standards and Projects in SC 27, mainly WG 5 (2014-12)



Privacy/PII Standards and Projects in SC 27, mainly WG 5 (2016-05)



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- Individuals
 - want to **control the amount of identity information** visible from the outside.
 - consider what personal information they reveal to whom.
- Typical protection techniques are:
 - **Anonymization** and identity management tools
 - Spontaneous switching between different levels of anonymity and pseudonymity depending on the context

- Privacy-enhancing technologies
- Privacy-friendly technologies
- Privacy-preserving technologies
- Privacy-protecting technologies
- Privacy-respecting technologies

Building Blocks and Approaches for Privacy Technologies

- Strong privacy requirements:
 - No trust in the system operator, and
 - No trust into one centralized entity.
- Most common methods consider:
 - Communication systems, or
 - Transactions systems

- The Anonymizer

www.anonymizer.com

- Mixmaster – Anonymous Remailer

<http://mixmaster.sourceforge.net>

- Onion Routing: Tor Network

<http://tor.eff.org/>

- Java Anonymous Proxy (JAP)

<http://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de>

- Cookie Cooker


www.cookiecooker.de

- P3P - Platform for Privacy Preferences

www.w3.org/P3P

- Reachability management
- Credential technologies
 - U-Prove
www.microsoft.com/uprove
 - Idemix
www.zurich.ibm.com/security/idemix


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
www.anonymizer.com

- ↑ Client (anonymity) is protected in an “anonymity set” of all possible proxy clients.
- ↓ Anonymizer learns about client’s activities / interests.
- ↓ No protection against attackers with global view.

Mixes and Onion Routing



- *Communication is anonymized by multiple mix servers, also called onion routers.*
 - *Both onion routing and JAP are based on the same Mix concept.*




$[A_{\text{Mix}1}, e_{\text{Mix}1}(A_{\text{Mix}2}, e_{\text{Mix}2}(M, r_a), r_b)]$

- Decode, buffer, reorder, and resend incoming messages
- Protect **unlinkability** of input / output messages
- Protect **unobservability** of connections and relations
- No single point of trust / failure


Symbols:
 A address
 e() encryption function
 d() decryption function
 M core message
 r random value
 [] message boundary

[Chaum1981]

- Choose the way of your message through the mixes!
- Protection guaranteed as long as one chosen mix withstands attacks.
- Free path results in additional confusion, but smaller anonymity set.




$$[A_{\text{Mix7}}, e_{\text{Mix7}}(A_{\text{Mix4}}, e_{\text{Mix4}}(A_{\text{Mix5}}, e_{\text{Mix5}}(A_{\text{Mix2}}, e_{\text{Mix2}}(M, r_a), r_b), r_c), r_d)]$$



- Fixed Path through the network
- No mix addresses required in messages
- All traffic flows over the same mixes.
- Protection guaranteed as long as one mix withstands attacks


Avoid linkability risks



Java Anonymity Proxy (JAP)


- Users can choose between multiple mix-cascades
- Number of active users is a heuristic for level of anonymity achieved
- Current version does not achieve security against a global attacker but can protect against local attackers
 - your boss
 - your provider
 - operator of a mix

<http://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de>




- Tor is a **network of virtual tunnels** that allows people and groups to improve their privacy and security on the Internet
- Distributed anonymous network
- Tor allows users to change circuits during sessions
 - Aims to minimize linkability of actions
- May be affected by the data retention directive (as well as JAP)
 - Anonymity and data logs?

[Europe2006]



<http://tor.eff.org>




How Tor Works: 3





Alice

 Step 3: If the user wants access to another site, Alice's Tor client selects a second random path. Again, **green links** are encrypted, **red links** are in the clear.


Dave




Jane

Bob

<http://tor.eff.org>

- Confuse data collectors
 - Exchange of cookies between users
 - Exchange of identities
 - Use of „faked“ data
- User-defined identity management
 - Assistance for the registration
 - Application of „real“ and „faked“ data
- Spam protection through disposable email addresses
- Ad blocking
- Integrated with JAP Anonymizer

Nowadays only disposable email addresses



- Standard of declaring privacy preferences in a standardized way
 - snapshot of how a web site handles personal information about its users
 - P3P enabled browsers can "read" this snapshot and compare it to the consumer's set of privacy preferences.
- P3P aimed at enhancing user control by
 - putting privacy policies where users can find them,
 - in a form users can understand, and
 - enables users to act on what they see. [W3C P3P]
- Unfortunately this promise has not yet been fulfilled.

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- Reachability management
- Credential technologies
 - U-Prove
www.microsoft.com/uprove
 - Idemix
www.zurich.ibm.com/security/idemix

Statement of urgency

“It is really urgent!”

Specification of a function

“I am your boss!”

Specification of a subject

“Let’s have a party tonight.”

Presentation of a voucher

“I welcome you calling back.”

Provision of a reference

“My friends are your friends!”

Offering a surety

“Satisfaction guaranteed
or this money is yours!”

RMS Question

The subscriber wishes to be informed of your identity before the call could be connected.

Katrin Rannenberg's RMS requests for your identity:

Id: none
Damker [DS 97], Herbert
Damker, Herbert
Pseudonym Harry Hurtig (P)

RMS Question

At the moment the subscriber can only accept urgent calls. Please decide!


Katrin Rannenberg's RMS requires an answer to the request above:

My call is urgent, please connect.
 At the moment my call is not so urgent.

Cancel Answer

[Rannenberg2000]


Privacy (and Security) Issues of Typical Federated IdM Architectures



- Privacy features:
 - Different levels of pseudonymity
 - Selective (minimal) disclosure of attributes (attribute hiding)
 - Unlinkability of user's transactions
- Additional features are possible:
 - Prove age without disclosing birthday, e.g. for buying alcohol, showing being over 18
 - Proving of not being revoked, without disclosing the serial number in the credential
 - Predicates over attributes (no disclosure) with a constant value or another attribute
 - Inequality of attributes
 - Equality of attributes
 - Value belonging to a certain interval
 - Controlled linkability, e.g. avoid voting more than once
 - Conditional accountability, when needed

Two Approaches for Privacy-ABCs


Blind Signatures



U-Prove

Brands, Paquin et al.
Discrete Logs, RSA,...


Zero-Knowledge Proofs



Idemix (Identity Mixer)

Damgard, Camenisch & Lysyanskaya
Strong RSA, pairings (LMRS, q-SDH)

ABC4Trust Architecture High Level View



PETs Alone are not Sufficient

- Anonymization and Pseudonymization
 - Mix-Master, Onion Routing, Anonymous Payment, Anonymous Credentials
 - A myriad of techniques and algorithms

- Playing Cat and Mouse with Big Brother
 - Best example is Cookie Cooker
 - But many people do not have the time.

- Good pragmatic tool, but still no success
 - ⇒ Integrated privacy protection,
 - ⇒ Into business processes
 - ⇒ Into user interfaces

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Privacy by Design (PbD)

- PbD refers to the philosophy and approach of embedding privacy into the design specifications of various technologies.
- The concept is an example of value sensitive design, i.e., to take human values into account in a well defined matter throughout the whole process.

The 7 Foundational Principles of PbD


- **Proactive not Reactive:**
 - anticipates and prevents privacy invasive events before they happen
- **Privacy as the Default Setting:**
 - seeks to deliver the maximum degree of privacy by ensuring that personal data are automatically protected in any given IT system or business practice
- **Privacy Embedded into Design:**
 - embedded into the design and architecture of IT systems and business practices. It is not bolted on as an add-on, after the fact
- **Full Functionality – Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum:**
 - Privacy by Design avoids the pretense of false dichotomies, such as privacy vs. security, demonstrating that it is possible to have both.
- **End-to-End Security – Full Lifecycle Protection:**
 - having been embedded into the system prior to the first element of information being collected, extends securely throughout the entire lifecycle of the data involved – strong security measures are essential to privacy, from start to finish.
- **Visibility and Transparency – Keep it Open:**
 - seeks to assure all stakeholders that whatever the business practice or technology involved, it is in fact, operating according to the stated promises and objectives, subject to independent verification. Its component parts and operations remain visible and transparent, to users and providers alike. Remember, trust but verify.
- **Respect for User Privacy – Keep it User-Centric:**
 - PbD requires architects and operators to keep the interests of the individual uppermost by offering such measures as strong privacy defaults, appropriate notice, and empowering user-friendly options. Keep it user-centric.

[Cavoukian2009]


- Enhance privacy for typical LBS
 - Pharmacy search (“pull”)
 - Pollen warning (“push”)
- Address wide user range by making only few requirements on the existing infrastructure
 - Simple WAP mobile phone (Version 1), Java phone (Version 2)
- Several challenges
 - Privacy problems
 - Regulation, e.g. of the handling of personal information (and mobile services in general)
 - Business constraints
 - Easy integration into existing infrastructure
 - Applicability to a wide range of business models
 - Adaptability for different market structures

PRIME LBS Application Prototype Intermediary Approach


Architecture Overview




- First transfers into the “real world”
 - „Privacy Gateway“ infrastructure component deployed at T-Mobile Germany and then Deutsche Telekom
 - Allows subscribers to set
 - Which application provider gets data?
 - On which days and times?
- Request for more power on the device for e.g. maintaining one's own policies
- Computers reflect even closer one's mind, e.g. one's trust relations.




- Transfer into regular service




Privacy (and security) issues of typical federated IdM architectures



- Attribute-Based Credentials for Trust:
<https://www.abc4trust.eu>
- Coordinated by Goethe University Frankfurt
- 12 partners from 7 countries.
- Objectives:
 - to define a common, unified architecture for ABC systems to allow comparing their respective features and combining them on common platforms, and
 - to deliver open reference implementations of selected ABC systems and deploy them in actual production pilots allowing provably accredited members of restricted communities to provide anonymous feedback on their community or its members.



ABC4Trust Architecture High Level View




- ABC4Trust tested the technology in two pilots:
 - Anonymous course evaluation in the University of Patras, Greece.
 - Students used smartcards to collect credentials for the courses they are attending.
 - At the end of semester they were able to evaluate the course if they have attended enough number of lectures.
 - Their votes will not be linkable to their identity while the technology prohibits them from voting multiple times.
 - Privacy preserving school community platform in Söderhamn, Sweden.
 - Providing online services such as chat rooms, consultations, advices, etc.
 - Pupils satisfying certain policies based on their attributes can access certain services e.g. based on age, classroom, level, etc.

Anonymous Course Evaluation


University Registration Office

Course
Evaluation
System



- ① The students receive a credential when they enrol in a course.
- ② The students anonymously collect credentials for attending each lecture of the courses.
- ③ At the end of semester they can prove that they have taken the course and participated at enough lectures to be able to evaluate the course without disclosing their identity.

Privacy preserving school community platform




- Privacy advisor that helps users against potentially identity revelations while using privacy-preserving systems
- Automatic detection of privacy sensitive data
- Risk analysis
- Effective communication of the risk to users

Styx: Privacy Risk Communication Method for Smartphones

- **Styx Log.**
 - Information about information flows will be stored here. The monitoring component is responsible for creating new log entries.
- **Styx Pattern Collection.**
 - Since privacy impacts are modeled as behavioral patterns of apps, Styx must have access to a set of such privacy-impacting behavioral patterns in order to match application behavior with privacy impacts. Pre-defined patterns are stored in the pattern collection database.
- **Styx Pattern Detection.**
 - The actual matching between observed app behavior and PIBPs is performed by the Styx Pattern Detection engine. This component is triggered by the monitoring component after a new entry has been stored in the log
- **Styx Notification.**
 - This component is responsible for notifying the user about matches that have been identified by the pattern detection.

Benefits of Privacy Risk Communications

- An improved privacy-risk communication leads to:
 - increased privacy and risk awareness,
 - better comprehension of risks,
 - better comparison of apps,
 - privacy as a stronger decision factor,
 - safer app choices.



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