## mobile business

#### Assignment 2:

Access Control



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Ass. Prof. Dr. Jetzabel Serna-Olvera

#### M.Sc. Fatbardh Veseli

Deutsche Telekom Chair of Mobile Business & Multilateral Security Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt a. M. www.m-chair.net



**Exercise 1: Access Control Matrix** 

**Exercise 2: Access Control Lists and Capability Lists** 

Exercise 3: Bell-LaPadula Model - Example 1

**Exercise 5: Role Based Access Control** 

**Exercise 5: Chinese Wall Model** 



#### Exercise 1: Access Control Matrix Alice can read FileX, can append to FileY, and can write to FileZ. Bob can append to FileX, can write to FileY, and cannot access FileZ.



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### Exercise 1

Alice can read FileX, can append to FileY, and can write to FileZ. Bob can append to FileX, can write to FileY, and cannot access FileZ.

1. Write the access control matrix M that specifies the described set of access rights for subjects Alice and Bob to objects FileX, FileY and FileZ.

	FileX	FileY	FileZ
Alice	{read}	{append}	{write}
Bob	{append}	{write}	{ }





2 a) What are the basic differences between **access control lists** (ACL) and **capability lists** (CLists)? Compare these approaches in terms of revocation of a user's access to a particular set of files.

- **Capability lists** are subject-focused:
  - For each subject, there is a list of objects
- Access control lists are object-focused.
  - For each object, there is a list of subjects
- → Therefore, revocation of an user's access to a particular file is easy when capability lists are used





Exercise 2

- ACL(FileX) = Alice: {read}, Bob: {append}
- ACL(FileY) = Alice: {append}, Bob: {write}
- ACL(FileZ) = Alice: {write}, Bob: {}



	FileX	FileY	FileZ
Alice	{read}	{append}	{write}
Bob	{append}	{write}	{ }



- CList(Alice) = FileX: {read}, FileY: {append}, FileZ: {write}
- CList(Bob) = FileX: {append}, FileY: {write}, FileZ: {}





Exercise 2



```
Exercise 3: Bell-LaPadula Model
Given the access rights defined in exercise 1,
the subject's security levels are
L_{Alice} = Confidential and
L_{Bob} = Secret,
```

```
the object's security levels are

L_{FileX} = Unclassified,

L_{FileY} = Secret,
```

```
L<sub>FileZ</sub> = Top Secret.
```

Top Secret > Secret > Confidential > Unclassified



3 a) Draw a Bell-LaPadula model which visualizes the access rights defined in access control matrix M.





3 b) Which of the following actions are allowed? Explain and justify your answer.

- 1. Alice reads FileX
- 2. Alice reads FileY
- 3. Bob appends to FileX
- 4. Bob appends to FileZ



mohile		FileX	FileY	FileZ	
bucipocc	Alice	{read}	{append}	{write}	Exercise 3
DUSINESS	Bob	$\{append\}$	{write}	{ }	
Subjects' Level: L <sub>Alic</sub> Objects ' Level : L <sub>File</sub>	<sub>e</sub> = Cor < = Unc	nfidential classified,	, $L_{Bob} = S$ $L_{FileY} = S$	Secret Secret,	L <sub>FileZ</sub> = Top Secret

- 1. Alice reads FileX
  - Access Control Matrix:

	FileX	FileY	FileZ
Alice	{read}	{append}	{write}
Bob	{append}	{write}	{ }

**Condition**: read  $\in$  M(Alice, FileX)  $\rightarrow$   $\checkmark$ 

Security Levels:

```
Condition: L_{Alice} \ge L_{FileX} \rightarrow \checkmark
L_{Alice} = Confidential, L_{FileX} = Unclassified
```

```
\rightarrow Grant access \checkmark
```

mohile		FileX	FileY	FileZ		
businoss	Alice	{read}	{append}	{write}	Exercise 3	
DUSINESS	Bob	$\{append\}$	{write}	{ }		
Subjects' Level: L <sub>Alice</sub> Objects ' Level : L <sub>File</sub>	e = Cor c = Unc	nfidential classified,	, $L_{Bob} = S$ $L_{Filey} = S$	Secret Secret,	L <sub>FileZ</sub> = Top Secret	

#### 2. Alice reads FileY

Access Control Matrix:

	FileX	FileY	FileZ
Alice	{read}	{append}	{write}
Bob	{append}	{write}	{ }

**Condition**: read  $\in$  M(Alice, FileY)  $\rightarrow$  X

Security Levels:

```
Condition: L_{Alice} \ge L_{FileY} \rightarrow X
L_{Alice} = Confidential, L_{FileY} = Secret
```

```
\rightarrow Deny access X
```

mohile		FileX	FileY	FileZ	
businoss	Alice	{read}	{append}	{write}	Exercise 3
DUSINESS	Bob	$\{append\}$	{write}	{ }	
Subjects' Level: L <sub>Alice</sub> Objects ' Level : L <sub>File</sub>	<sub>e</sub> = Cor ( = Unc	nfidential classified,	, $L_{Bob} = S$ $L_{FileY} = S$	Secret Secret,	L <sub>FileZ</sub> = Top Secret

- 3. Bob appends to FileX
  - Access Control Matrix:

	FileX	FileY	FileZ
Alice	{read}	{append}	{write}
Bob	{append}	{write}	{ }

**Condition**: append  $\in$  M(Bob, FileX)  $\rightarrow$   $\checkmark$ 

Security Levels:

```
Condition: L_{Bob} \leq L_{FileX} \rightarrow X
L_{Bob} = Secret, L_{FileX} = Unclassified
```

```
\rightarrow Deny access X
```

mohile		FileX	FileY	FileZ	
bucinocc	Alice	{read}	{append}	{write}	Exercise 3
DUSINESS	Bob	$\{append\}$	{write}	{ }	
Subjects' Level: L <sub>Alic</sub> Objects ' Level : L <sub>File</sub>	<sub>e</sub> = Cor <sub>(</sub> = Unc	nfidential classified,	, $L_{Bob} = S$ $L_{Filey} = S$	Secret Secret,	L <sub>FileZ</sub> = Top Secret

- 4. Bob appends to FileZ
  - Access Control Matrix:

	FileX	FileY	FileZ
Alice	{read}	{append}	{write}
Bob	{append}	{write}	{ }

**Condition:** append  $\in$  M(Bob, FileZ)  $\rightarrow$  X

Security Levels:

```
Condition: L_{Bob} \leq L_{FileZ} \rightarrow \checkmark
L_{Bob} = Secret, L_{FileZ} = Top Secret
```

```
\rightarrow Deny access X
```

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Exercise 4: Role Based Access Control (RBAC) Consider a simplified scenario in a bank and the concept of RBAC. In order to perform a change (transaction) on an account (to mandate deposits and withdrawals), a customer use his card to "unlock" the account (authorize the transaction). He can do this by being registered in the bank in the role of a "Customer" and bringing his chip-card (bank card) to a card reader. The account of this customer is then authorized (unlocked) during the duration of this session, and authorized subjects can perform changes to this account. In the following, this kind of account "unlocking" will be denoted as "authorization".



Exercise 4 - RBAC (2)

The following roles and their corresponding rights are valid in this scenario:

Role	Rights
Bank employee	Read all account data
Base	Read Terms of Use
Auditor	Perform audit
Branch Manager	Open and authorize account(s)' transactions (even without a chip card)
Cashier	Change an authorized account
Client Advisor	Open bank account
Client	Authorize own account

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### Exercise 4 - RBAC (3)

**Roles:** Bank employee, Base, Auditor, Branch Manager, Cashier, Client Advisor, Client.

a) draw a role-based access control diagram for this scenario



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### Exercise 4 - RBAC (4)

**Roles:** Bank employee, Base, Auditor, Branch Manager, Cashier, Client Advisor, Client.

b) The subject Cash machine (ATM) has the role Cashier. Can the ATM from this function perform the following:

- Withdraw cash from an authorized account: ✔
- Withdraw cash from an unauthorized account: 🗶
- Show account balance: ?





#### Exercise 5: Chinese Wall Model

Take the Chinese Wall Model and the COI classes for three different industries: telecommunications, aviation, and food industry.



# Chinese Wall Model (1)

5a) Which COI classes do you have access to in the beginning?



# Exercise 5 – Chinese Wall Model

5a) Which COI classes do you have access to in the beginning?



# Chinese Wall Model (2)

b) You are assigned to consult and given access to the company datasets of Telekom, Lufthansa, and Lindt. Which individual company files do you have access to now and which not?



# Misc:

#### • Bell-LaPadula and Execution rights

270	0 Sicherheitsmo
Zugriffsoperation	Beschränkung für Subjekt s und Objek
<pre>read(file) exec(file)</pre>	$sc(s) \ge sc(o)$ $sc(s) \ge sc(o)$
write(file)	sc(s) = sc(o)
overwrite(file) append(file)	sc(s) = sc(o) $sc(s) = sc(o)$
stat(i-node)	$sc(s) \ge sc(o)$
<pre>change(1-node) read(directory)</pre>	sc(s) = sc(o) $sc(s) > sc(o)$
search(directory)	$sc(s) \ge sc(o)$
create(directory)	sc(s) = sc(o) $sc(s) = sc(o)$
unlink(directory)	sc(s) = sc(o)
<pre>vrite(signal/ipc)</pre>	$sc(s) \ge sc(o)$
<pre>xill(signal/ipc)</pre>	sc(s) = sc(o) $sc(s) = sc(o)$

Claudia Eckert. *IT-Sicherheit*. München, Wien: Oldenbourg, 2004

Tabelle 6.3: Bell-LaPadula-Regeln für Unix System V/MLS-Kommandos



#### Thanks for your attention!

