Personalised Privacy By Default Preferences - Experiment and Analysis -

Toru Nakamura¹, Shinsaku Kiyomoto¹, Welderufael B. Tesfay², and Jetzabel Serna-Olvera²

¹KDDI R&D Laboratories Inc., Saitama, Japan

²Chair for Mobile Business & Multilateral Security, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfult am Main, Germany {tr-nakamura, kiyomoto}@kddilabs.jp, {welderufael.tesfay, jetzabel.serna-olvera}@m-chair.de

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Abstract: In this paper, we present a novel mechanism that provides individuals with personalised privacy by default

setting when they register into a new system or service. The proposed approach consists of an intelligent mechanism that learns users' context and preferences to generate personalised default privacy settings. To achieve this, we used a machine learning approach that requires a minimal number of questions at the registration phase, and, based on users' responses, sets up privacy settings associated to users' privacy preferences for a particular service. This is the first attempt to predict general privacy preferences from a minimal number of questions. We propose two approaches. The first scheme is based on the sole use of SVM to predict users' personalised settings. The second scheme implemented an additional layer that includes clustering. The accuracy of proposed approaches is evaluated by comparing the guessed answers against the answers from a questionnaire administered to 10,000 participants. Results show that, the SVM based scheme is able to guess the the full set of personalised privacy settings with an accuracy of 85%, by using a limited

input of only 5 answers from the user.

1 INTRODUCTION

Default privacy settings play a major role in restricting or revealing personally identifiable information of Internet service users. On the one hand, highly restrictive privacy settings limit the information sharing utilities of services, while on the other hand less restrictive privacy settings can significantly damage the privacy of users. best case scenario is to have a personalised privacy and utility optimal preference setting that meets the user's particular needs. The challenge is that service providers do not provide privacy optimal and tailored preference settings by default, and most users are not capable of establishing such settings by themselves. The extent to which users are capable of setting their preferences depends on their skill level and understanding of the setting (Hargittai et al., 2010). According to (Liu et al., 2011), typical preferences, e.g., those set by social network sites such as Facebook on behalf of users, meet the expectations of users only 37% times. Moreover, (Deuker, 2010), stated that users exhibit privacy paradox behaviour, in that, despite their increasing privacy concerns most of

them are reluctant to take further steps and alter the default settings set by the service providers that do not take individual preferences into account.

Not having properly and optimally set privacy preferences greatly increases the privacy concerns of end users. In particular, the new direction of commercial services such as O2O (Online-to-Offline), are attended by a series of privacy concerns that have become a serious issue, mainly due to the expansion of service collaborations (Basu et al., 2011; Scipioni and Langheinrich, 2011).

In this regard, situations such as being diverted to services users were previously totally unaware of having a relationship with, have resulted in even more privacy concerns among users. An example of this is Internet ads. Studies conducted by (Guha et al., 2010; Korolova, 2010), have suggested that Internet ads, which are personalised through the use of private data, may be responsible for leaking users' private information. As a result, privacy is an increasingly important aspect that might hinder users' willingness to publish personal data. Therefore, to properly address users' privacy concerns, they need to be aware of what data are being collected and for what

purposes. To accomplish this aim, access control mechanisms based on users' privacy preferences are a key function for providing personal data without creating anxiety in users. However, it is difficult to manually configure appropriate privacy settings where the combinations of service providers, types of personal data, and the purposes to which personal data are put, become huge.

Hence, it is important to simplify this task of setting privacy-preserving default preferences by providing tailoring mechanisms that will address individual privacy concerns, and provide personalised privacy settings to users.

Therefore, in this paper, we propose a mechanism for automatic generation of personalised privacy settings. The main objective is to automatically provide optimised default preference settings to support users' online interactions, while minimising privacy risks. To achieve this aim, the basic approach consists of delivering a minimal set of questions to each user at the time of registration, and from the answers, to predict the default privacy settings for each user. We consider a set of 80 different parameters associated with different types of data for 16 different utilisation purposes. formulated a questionnaire that allowed us to find out the privacy concerns of users, and their acceptability of providing personal data for different purposes. The questionnaire was carried out in the form of web survey with approximately 10,000 participants. Second, we propose a guessing scheme based on machine learning. The basic scheme implements SVM (Support Vector Machine). In this scheme we first generate the SVM models for a full set of settings by considering only a few answers for the privacy settings. Finally, we propose an extension of the basic scheme by using SVM combined with clustering scheme.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows, Section 2 provides an overview of related work in the area of privacy preferences. Section 3 describes the main methodology used in this research work. Section 4 introduces the proposed approach, which is evaluated in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the advantages and limitation of this approach, while Section 7 draws the main conclusions and points out future directions of research.

2 RELATED WORK

In privacy policy management the burden of checking on and maintaining privacy policies has been identified as a major issue. In one study,

Madejski et al. (Madejski et al., 2012) showed that a serious mismatch existed between intentions for privacy settings and real settings in an online social network service. Users are commonly required to check the privacy policies of a given service offered by a service provider before starting to use the service. Thus, each service provider prepares a privacy policy for each service. Because it is frequently the case that users must check a large number of privacy policies, it becomes irksome and difficult to understand. Consequently, users are not able to determine or customise the privacy policies for themselves. Furthermore, if a user does not agree with the privacy policy of a service, the user simply cannot use the service.

In this regard, Solove suggested that the privacy self-management model cannot achieve its objectives, and it has been pushed beyond its limits, while privacy law has been relying too heavily upon the privacy self-management model (Solove, 2013). Moreover, other studies such as the experimental study conducted by Acquisti and Grossklags (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005) demonstrated users' lack of knowledge about technological and legal forms of privacy protection when confirming privacy policies. Their observations suggest that several difficulties obstruct individuals in their attempts to protect their own private information, even those concerned about and motivated to protect their privacy. This was reinforced by authors in (Pollach, 2007) who also supported the presumption that users are not familiar with technical and legal terms related to privacy. Moreover, it was suggested that users' knowledge about privacy threats and technologies that help to protect their privacy is inadequate (Jensen et al., 2005). In this regard, Guo and Chen (Guo and Chen, 2012) proposed an algorithm to optimise privacy configurations based on desired privacy level and utility preference of users.

Following similar directions, the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) (W3C, 2002; Cranor, 2003) was designed to enable websites to express their privacy practices in a standard format that can be retrieved automatically and interpreted easily by user agents. The project provides user agent modules that allow users to be informed of site practices and to automate decision-making based on these practices when appropriate. However, in practice, it has not been widely adopted by online and offline services (Pedersen, 2003). That is, mainly due to its complex policy definitions, even though some browsers have a module for privacy matching. Furthermore, the module is to be implemented only on web browsers.

The Privacy Bird (Cranor et al., 2002; Cranor et al., 2006) is an extension of a web browser and automatically retrieves the P3P policies of a web site. However, Kolter and Pernul(Kolter and Pernul, 2009) suggested that the available privacy preference settings of the Privacy Bird result in inadequate user acceptance, putting the ultimate goal of real-world use at risk. Thus, they proposed a user-friendly, P3P-based privacy preference generator (Kolter and Pernul, 2009) for service providers, including a configuration wizard and a preference summary.

Yee proposed a privacy policy checker (Yee, 2009) for online services. The checker compares the user privacy policy with the provider privacy policy and then automatically determines whether the service can be used. Biswas proposed an algorithm (Biswas, 2012) that detects conflicts in privacy settings between user preferences and the requirements of an application on a smart phone. Privacy Butler (Wishart et al., 2010) is a personal privacy manager that can monitor a person's online presence and attempts to make corrections based on a privacy policy for a user's online presence in a social network. The concept of the Privacy Butler is similar to the concept of our project, but it focuses on modifications to content hosted by social networking services; it monitors whether the modification is a satisfactory match for the privacy policy. Privacy Mirror (Bylund et al., 2008) is a tool that is intended to show users what information about them is available online. Srivastava (Srivastava and Geethakumari, 2013; Srivastava and Geethakumari, 2014) proposed a privacy settings recommender system for a certain online social network service.

Fang et al. (Fang and LeFevre, 2010; Fang et al., 2010) have proposed a privacy wizard for social networking sites. The purpose of the wizard is to automatically configure a user's privacy settings with minimal effort required by the user. The wizard is based on the underlying observation that real users conceive their privacy preferences based on an implicit structure. Thus, after asking the user a limited number of carefully chosen questions, it is usually possible to build a machine learning model that accurately predicts the user's privacy preferences. This approach is very similar to ours. The difference is the target dataset. Fang et al. treated real data of Facebook, so the variety of the data items was limited and the number of the participants is small. We treat more general data items and the number of the participants is larger because our approach does not focus on a specific service such as Facebook.

Some languages to describe privacy policies have been presented in (Cranor, 2003; Dehghantanha

et al., 2010; Bekara et al., 2010). Backes *et al.* examined some comparisons of enterprise privacy policies using formal abstract syntax and semantics to express the policy contents (Backes et al., 2004). Tondel and Nyre (Tondel and Nyre, 2012) proposed a similarity metric for comparing machine-readable privacy policies.

There is some existing research about learning privacy preferences. Berendt et al. et al., 2005) emphasised the importance of privacy preference generation and Sadah et al. et al., 2009) suggested that machine learning techniques have the power to generate more accurate preferences than users themselves in a mobile social networking application. Tondel et al. et al., 2011) proposed a conceptual architecture for learning privacy preferences based on the decisions a user makes in their normal interactions on the They suggested that learning of privacy preferences has the potential to increase the accuracy of preferences without requiring users to have a high level of knowledge or willingness to invest time and effort in their privacy. Kellev et al. (Kelley et al., 2008) showed preferences for a mobile social network application. Preference modeling for eliciting preferences was studied by Bufett and Fleming (Buffett and Fleming, 2007). Mugan et (Mugan et al., 2011) proposed a method for generating persona and suggestions intended to help users incrementally refine their privacy preferences over time.

3 DATA COLLECTION

In this study, we have developed a questionnaire that allowed us to learn about users' willingness to share personal data for different types of services, and therefore, be able to map those preferences to the user privacy preference setup. For this purpose, we first identified different kinds of personal data and utilisation purposes defined in P3P (W3C, 2002) . There are respectively shown in Tables 2 and 3.

The questionnaire was designed taking into account each combination of personal data type and utilisation purposes. While the main purpose was to identify users' privacy preferences, we also raise privacy awareness by delivering information about the benefits and risks of providing access to certain data.

We published an online survey and collected the answers from 10,000 participants recruited by a research services company. The distribution of the participants was shown in Table 1. The distribution was uniform on all the categories. Each participant evaluated all 80 combinations of kinds of personal data and utilisation purposes on a Likert scale of 1 to 6 ("1" for strongly disagree, and "6" for strongly agree.). Table 4 shows the distribution of the results. As it can be observed from Table 4, the percentage decreases with the increasing acceptance of providing personal data. We used the collected data as input for our proposed guessing schemes (Section 4). Furthermore, in order to simplify our models, we merged the obtained results into the following three classes on a scale from 0 to 2, i.e., i) 1 & 2 into scale 0; ii) 3 & 4 into scale 1; and, iii) 5 & 6 into scale 2.

Table 1: Distribution of participants

Age	ratio (%)
20s	10.0
30s	10.0
40s	10.0
50s	10.0
Over 60	10.0
20s	10.0
30s	10.0
40s	10.0
50s	10.0
Over 60	10.0
	20s 30s 40s 50s Over 60 20s 30s 40s 50s

Table 2: Kinds of personal data

	1
No.	Data type
1	Addresses and telephone numbers
2	Email addresses
3	Service accounts
4	Purchase records
5	Bank accounts
6	Device information (e.g., IP addresses, OS)
7	Browsing histories
8	Logs on a search engine
9	Personal info (age, gender, income)
10	Contents of email, blog, twitter etc.
11	Session information (e.g., Cookies)
12	Social Info. (e.g., religion, volunteer records)
13	Medical Info.
14	Hobby
15	Location Info.
16	Official ID (national IDs or license numbers)

4 GUESSING SCHEMES

This section introduces our initial approach, which considers two guessing schemes, both implementing SVM as a basis. We selected SVM

Table 3: Utilization purposes

No.	Data purpose
Α	Providing the service
В	System administration
C	Marketing
D	Behaviour analysis
E	Recommendation

because it is considered a powerful learning system, although mainly for binary-class problems (Gunn et al., 1998). Nevertheless we consider that SVMs can also efficiently perform non-linear classification by implicitly mapping their inputs into high-dimensional feature spaces through a nonlinear mapping chosen a priori. Therefore, for the purpose of our experiments, we used a multilabel and multiclass SVM approach.

We proposed the first scheme based on the sole use of SVM; while the second scheme implemented an additional layer that include clustering techniques. Both schemes, i.e., the SVM-based, and the combined scheme (SVM and clustering) consisted of two phases; the *learning phase* and *guessing phase*.

4.1 SVM-based Scheme

The learning and guessing phases performed by the SVM-based scheme are explained next.

[Learning Phase]

- 1. We select n questions where $1 \le n \le Max$. Max equals the total number of questions and n equals the number of selected questions used for guessing the corresponding answers.
- 2. We generate the SVM models in which the class labels are the acceptance level for each of the unselected Max n questions using a combination of answers for n as sample points in the training data.

[Guessing Phase]

1. For each unknown point, i.e., a combination of answers to selected n questions, we use the SVM models generated in the learning phase for each unselected question and calculate the guessed values of the answers to those Max - n unselected questions.

4.2 Combined Scheme

Similar to Section 4.1, the combined scheme consisted of two phases: the learning phase and guessing phase, the main steps of which are introduced next.

[Learning phase]

Table 4: Distribution of result

Likert scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
Number	317497	238826	145952	67629	24583	5513	800000
Ratio	0.39687	0.2985	0.1824	0.08454	0.03073	0.006891	1

- 1. We generate clusters from the training data with the corresponding clustering algorithm. Each cluster is assigned a cluster ID $i(1 \le i \le k)$, where k is the total number of clusters. A gravity point of a cluster is regarded as the representative values of the cluster.
- 2. We select n questions, where $1 \le n \le Max$. Max equals the total number of questions and n equals the number of selected questions used for guessing the corresponding answers.
- 3. We generate an SVM model in which the class label is mapped to the cluster ID by using as sample points, a combination of answers to selected *n* questions in the training data.

[Guessing Phase]

 For each unknown point (i.e., a combination of answers to selected n questions), we calculated the guessed values of a cluster ID to which the unknown point belongs. We regarded the representative values (i.e., the gravity point of the cluster) as the guessed values of answers to the Max – n unselected questions.

5 RESULTS

The proposed approach (Section 4) was implemented in a proof of concept and evaluated with real user data collected from the questionnaires. Hence, this section introduces our initial experimental results. We implemented the proposed scheme with R, and "e1071" package of SVM (Meyer et al.,). We evaluated each scheme by running the experiments 10 times.

The data samples were chosen randomly, and were split into training data and testing data. Table. 5 shows the summary of parameters used in our experimental setup.

We performed two different experiments for each of the schemes. We first selected the top combinations, TC = 15 of n questions that achieved the highest accuracy considering 150 entries randomly selected; i.e., 100 entries for the training data, 50 entries for the testing data. We limited the experiment to 150 entries in order to decrease the running time when evaluating all possible combinations. We used the same top combinations,

TC = 15 of *n* questions and evaluated the scheme using 10,000 entries (i.e., 9,000 for training data, and 1000 for testing data). Note that in the second experiment we cannot claim that the selected 15 combinations provide the highest accuracy.

The experiment's main steps for each of the schemes are explained in the following subsections.

Table 5: Experimental settings

Parameter	Value
Max	80
n	5
Top Combinations (TC)	TC = 15
Training Data (TRD)	TRD = 100, TRD = 9000
Test Data (TED)	TED = 50, TED = 1000

5.1 SVM-based Scheme

The procedure of evaluation with the training data is as follows.

- 1. As shown in Table. 5, we first defined that n equals 5 as the number of selected questions, from a total number of Max = 80;
- 2. We generated the corresponding SVM models in which the class labels were the acceptance level for each of the unselected Max n questions. We used as sample points a combination of answers for the selected n questions in the training data.
- 3. For all 80 answers of each instance (participant) in the training data, we used the SVM models for each of the unselected Max n questions (i.e., 75), and n answers to selected n questions for each instance. Afterwards, we calculated the guessed values of the answers to the unselected questions.
- 4. We calculated all the participants' guessed values of answers to unselected Max n questions by repeating Step 3 for all the participants in the training data.
- 5. We compared the original values of answers to the 75unselected questions in the training data with the guessed values of those calculated in Step 4. Finally, we regard the percentage of correctly guessed values as the accuracy of the proposed scheme.

The procedure of evaluation with the testing data is as follows.

- 1. We considered the SVM models generated in the learning phase.
- 2. For all the 80 answers of a participant in the testing data, we calculated the guessed values of answers to the 75 unselected questions.
- We calculated all the participants' guessed values of answers to the 75 unselected questions by repeating step 3 for each participant in the testing data.
- 4. We compared the original values of the answers to the 75 unselected questions in the testing data with the guessed values of those calculated in step 4. We regard the percentage of correctly guessed values as the accuracy of the proposed scheme.

Table 6 shows the average of results obtained from 10 experiment runs considering the top 15 combinations (i.e., highest accuracy) of selected n questions. Each parameter of the SVM model was optimised by a grid search on the parameters C and γ . The results show a guessing accuracy of 83% for all top 15 combinations for 150 entries and 85% for 9 of the 15 top combinations.

5.2 Combined Scheme

The accuracy of the combined scheme was evaluated considering the guessed values of participants as the gravity points of the clusters to which participants belonged. The evaluation procedure consisted of the following steps.

- 1. Using a clustering technique, we first generated clusters of participants, that corresponded to the combinations of answers of the Max = 80 questions. As a result, each participant was assigned a cluster ID.
- 2. For each of the participants, we regarded the gravity point of his/her cluster as his/her guessed values for the *Max* answers.
- We compared the original values with the guessed values in the training data, and we regard the percentage of the correctly guessed values as the accuracy of the selected clustering algorithm.

We run the experiments using K-means (MacQueen et al., 1967), Ward's method (Ward Jr, 1963) and DB-Scan (Ester et al., 1996) as the selected clustering algorithm. For K-means and Ward's method, we evaluated them considering a different number of clusters from 1 to 30. In the case of DB-Scan, we evaluated it

considering different parameters *pts* from 2 to 6, and *eps* from 1 to 4. While K-means provided better accuracy (i.e., 77%) than Ward's method, for both the accuracy is increased by increasing the number of clusters; we evaluated the combination scheme with K-means using a total of 5 clusters. In the case of DB-Scan, it was difficult to directly compare it with K-means or Ward's method because in the DB-Scan algorithm the number of clusters cannot be decided in advance; however, in almost all cases, the accuracy of the DB-Scan algorithm was lower than K-means and Ward's method. Therefore, in the rest of the paper we focus only on K-means.

The evaluation procedure of the combined scheme with training data is as follows.

- 1. We generated clusters from training data using K-means. Each cluster was assigned a cluster ID $i(1 \le i \le 5)$.
- 2. We chose n equals 5 questions from a total number of Max = 80 questions.
- 3. We generated an SVM model in which the class labels corresponded to the cluster ID by using a combination of answers to selected n = 5 questions in training data as sample points.
- 4. For all the 80 answers of each participant in the training data, we calculated the guessed values of a cluster ID using the SVM model and the 5 answers of each participant to selected questions. We regarded the gravity point of the cluster as the guessed values of Max n i.e., 75 answers to unselected questions.
- 5. We calculated all the participants' guessed values of answers to the 75 unselected questions by repeating step 3 for each participant in the training data.
- 6. We compared the original values of answers to the 75 unselected questions in the training data with the guessed values of those calculated in step 4. We regarded the percentage of correctly guessed values as the accuracy of the proposed scheme.

The evaluation procedure of the combined scheme with testing data is as follows.

- 1. We used the SVM model generated in the learning phase in which the class label was associated with the cluster ID by using a combination of answers to the 5 selected questions in the training data as sample points.
- For all the 80 answers of a participant in the testing data, we calculated the guessed values of a cluster ID for the participant with the SVM model and the 5 answers of the participant to selected

Table 6: Results of SVM-scheme with optimization

	Co	ombinati	on			00, #Test data: 50	#Training data: 9,000, #Test data: 1,000		
					Accuracy for TRD	Accuracy for TED	Accuracy for TRD	Accuracy for TED	
A-8	B-12	C-16	D-14	E-11	0.894	0.83296	0.858903111	0.85662	
B-7	C-12	D-6	D-14	D-15	0.88928	0.832106667	0.853968889	0.851904	
B-12	B-15	D-5	D-8	E-6	0.88828	0.832293333	0.85102637	0.846982667	
B-7	C-16	D-11	D-14	E-11	0.887986667	0.835893333	0.854038815	0.85178	
B-4	B-15	D-14	E-6	E-11	0.887613333	0.832506667	0.852193333	0.849068	
B-8	C-16	D-14	E-10	E-11	0.887186667	0.83728	0.854693481	0.852498667	
A-8	B-12	D-6	D-14	E-11	0.884493333	0.83064	0.854496148	0.853093333	
B-4	B-15	D-6	D-14	E-11	0.884226667	0.83424	0.852772296	0.85098	
A-3	A-16	C-12	D-11	E-3	0.883733333	0.830426667	0.850421926	0.84796	
B-7	B-12	D-14	D-15	E-6	0.883586667	0.83272	0.853168444	0.850312	
B-7	C-14	D-10	D-16	E-11	0.88356	0.832106667	0.852408296	0.849949333	
B-7	C-12	D-10	D-16	E-11	0.883373333	0.83552	0.851519259	0.848646667	
A-2	B-7	D-14	D-16	E-11	0.8832	0.839066667	0.854657037	0.853193333	
A-12	B-7	C-14	D-6	D-15	0.88316	0.8348	0.853704741	0.85178	
A-12	B-8	C-16	E-10	E-11	0.882986667	0.832533333	0.852644741	0.849993333	

Table 7: Accuracy of the combined scheme (#Training data = 100, #Test data = 50)

Combination					Cluster accuracy for TRD	Accuracy for TRD	Accuracy for TED
A-11	A-11 A-15 B-4 C-2 D-6		0.744	0.8245	0.819975		
A-12	B-7	B-8	D-11	E-9	0.76	0.83405	0.8238
B-6	B-7	D-7	E-10	E-11	0.752	0.83355	0.8188
A-10	B-4	D-4	E-6	E-8	0.724	0.822475	0.81155
A-10	B-4	D-6	D-9	E-6	0.73	0.82835	0.82105
A-10	B-4	D-6	D-9	E-7	0.736	0.8317125	0.820525
A-10	B-4	D-7	D-9	E-6	0.725	0.828875	0.821175
A-10	B-4	D-9	E-4	E-6	0.711	0.8275	0.8192
A-11	B-4	B-8	D-10	E-6	0.721	0.828625	0.822875
A-11	B-4	D-10	E-6	E-13	0.7	0.8228	0.8152
A-13	B-4	D-11	E-6	E-11	0.712	0.827275	0.820375
A-16	B-6	B-10	D-8	E-6	0.775	0.8337875	0.8232
B-4	B-10	D-4	D-13	E-7	0.761	0.8310375	0.819125
B-4	D-4	D-6	D-13	E-12	0.754	0.8316375	0.8213
B-4 D-6 D-9 E-4 E-7		0.705	0.8225	0.8181			

questions. We regarded the gravity point of the cluster as the guessed values of 75 answers to unselected questions.

- 3. We calculated all the participants' guessed values of answers to 75 unselected questions by repeating step 3 for all the participants in the testing data.
- 4. We compared the original values of answers to 75 unselected questions in the training data with the guessed values of those calculated in step 4 and we regarded the percentage of correctly guessed values as the accuracy of this scheme.

The result is shown in Table 7. "Cluster accuracy for training data" means the percentage of correctly guessed values for the cluster ID calculated in step 4 of the evaluation procedure for the training data.

The best accuracy achieved by the combined scheme was 82%. This accuracy was achieved using 8 of the top 15 combinations for 150 entries, and 12 of the top 15 combinations for 10,000 entries.

6 DISCUSSION

In this paper, we have proposed a default privacy preference setting guessing scheme based on support vector machines, and a combination of support vector machines with clustering techniques. The scheme achieved a reasonably high level of precision for guessing the default privacy setting with minimal user input. Specifically, we had 80 questionnaire items out of which only five were used to guess for the remaining 75 questions. These automated default settings not only relieve users of the burden of carrying out tiresome privacy setting tasks, but also relieve them from having to make information disclosure decisions later on.

We argue that the proposed mechanism could be implemented as part of a privacy setting management system (Figure 1) by storing user's privacy settings and providing access control features to users' data. In a typical use case scenario the system will execute

•						` 0		
Combination				Cluster accuracy for TRD	Accuracy for TRD	Accuracy for TED		
Ì	A-11	A-15	B-4	C-2	D-6	0.731411111	0.81693	0.81735875
İ	A-12	B-7	B-8	D-11	E-9	0.748988889	0.82109125	0.82167
	B-6	B-7	D-7	E-10	E-11	0.724666667	0.822432917	0.823305
İ	A-10	B-4	D-4	E-6	E-8	0.744133333	0.820498889	0.8205675
	A-10	B-4	D-6	D-9	E-6	0.746	0.81941375	0.81997875
İ	A-10	B-4	D-6	D-9	E-7	0.763822222	0.823401111	0.8250475
İ	A-10	B-4	D-7	D-9	E-6	0.759411111	0.822305694	0.82301125
	A-10	B-4	D-9	E-4	E-6	0.751011111	0.819230278	0.8195725
İ	A-11	B-4	B-8	D-10	E-6	0.743255556	0.820663889	0.820705
	A-11	B-4	D-10	E-6	E-13	0.755888889	0.821184306	0.821355
İ	A-13	B-4	D-11	E-6	E-11	0.743044444	0.821143889	0.82237
İ	A-16	B-6	B-10	D-8	E-6	0.757722222	0.82313375	0.823545
İ	B-4	B-10	D-4	D-13	E-7	0.7456	0.8230475	0.82392625
İ	B-4	D-4	D-6	D-13	E-12	0.749477778	0.823683889	0.82439125
	B-4	D-6	D-9	E-4	E-7	0.7408	0.823176528	0.8243375

Table 8: Accuracy of Combination Scheme (#Training data = 9,000, #Test data = 1,000)

the guessing algorithm to generate the personalised privacy settings and show them to the user at the registration phase. The user can confirm or modify the suggested configuration.

Results show that the first scheme offers better accuracy (i.e., 85%) than the combined scheme (i.e., 82%). However, when compared to the combined scheme, the SVM only scheme performs more slowly due to the number of models that need to be created (i.e., 75). Thus, considering a minimum difference in accuracy (3%), one could decide to implement the combined scheme and have better performance, in particular considering that the additional time for clustering with K-means for 9,000 entries is minimal (i.e., 0.3 seconds) and therefore, can be ignored.

Moreover. even though our approach demonstrated the applicability of machine learning algorithms in privacy by default settings, the proposed approach has some limitations that should be considered in future research. The guessing precision of the algorithms is dependent on the training and testing input data provided to it by the user-answered questionnaire items. However, the correctness and genuineness of the answers is dependent on the user providing rational answers. In addition, the user study was carried out in Japan, and cultural characteristics may influence the extent to which the results can be applied to other societies. Furthermore, we limited our study to 5 questions considering the top 15 combinations of 150 entries, therefore, additional research is needed in order to determine both the optimal number and best combination of questions. Finally, the proposed approach only focused on privacy preference settings and, not on the multi-dimensional privacy issues that users face when using Internet services.




Figure 1: Use Case Scenario

7 CONCLUSION

The complexity of setting privacy preferences is a burden that often has to be put on to users. Furthermore, the intricacies of setting a privacy-optimal preference implicitly assume that users are able to choose the best privacy setting for themselves. While this may be true for privacy wizards, it has been shown that ordinary Internet users fall far short of being able to do this. This calls for the need to help users with efficient and tailored privacy preference mechanisms. Therefore, in this study, we have designed an approach based on machine learning to facilitate the privacy settings of users by asking them just five questions.

The results show that machine learning algorithms have great potential to automate privacy preference setting with minimal input from users. Future work will include further enhancing the accuracy of the preference setting results. To this end, we plan to investigate techniques for finding the combination of questions that will maximise the accuracy of the prediction scheme. Moreover, we plan to extend the proposed approach, by implementing a second step enabling the system to learn from users' privacy

preferences when they begin interacting with the associated service.

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